Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00181 01 OF 02 082052 Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

/026 W
---------- 007973
O P 081711 Z MAY 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1973
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0181

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR ADDITION OF E. O. AND TAGS INFORMATION

E. O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: SEMENOV STATEMENT MAY 8, 1973

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 8, 1973

IN THE COURSE OF THE SOVIET- AMERICAN SUMMIT TALKS
IN MOSCOW IN MAY 1972, THE SIDES, ALONG WITH CONCLUDING
THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO
THE LIMITATION STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ASSUMED
CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON
LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND TO CONDUCT THEM IN
A SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL, RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER' S LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS AND OSBSEJRVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY.
THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE USSR AND USA, WHICH WAS SIGNED AT THAT TIME, STATES
THAT THE SIDES " WILL (CONTINUE TO) MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO
LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. WHENEVER POSSIBLE THEY WILL
CONCLUDE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THESE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00181 01 OF 02 082052 Z

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

PURPOSES."

IN THIS CONNECTION IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES THAT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE MUST BE FUNDAMENTAL.

DURING THE WORKING RECESS THE SOVIET SIDE CAREFULLY ANALYZED THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GENEVA. TODAY AND SUB-SEQUENTLY WE INTEND TO SET FORTH THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE DATA OF THIS ANALYSIS.

APPARENTLY IT CANNOT BUT BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PAST ONE AND A HALF PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WERE USEFUL.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE FIRST PORTION OF THE CURRENT PHASE ARE FULLY BASED ON THE ABOVE- MENTIONED PRINCIPLE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIVE RESULTS ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE CAUSE OF LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, AS WELL AS THE DISCUS-SIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN GENEVA, WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT THEY OPEN THE WAY FOR WORKING OUT NEW AGREED MEASURES.

A FEW WORDS ON THE QUESTION OF LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT IS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS THAT STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMIISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE REQUIRES THAT IN WORKING OUT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES BE CONSIDERED AND THAT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ITS TOTALITY, INCLUDING THE PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, THE EXISTENCE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND BASES ON THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES, AND OTHE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY ONE CANNOT ACCEPT, FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, AN APPROACH UNDER WHICH SOME SORT OF ARITHMETIC EQUALITY IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN PROTION OF

SECRET

SECRET

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR EMBODIMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHILE OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL AS THE FACTORS OF WHICH I HAVE SPOKEN ABOVE, WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WOULD BE IGNORED.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

IN LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES. THE CAPABILITY OF ANY STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DEPENDS UPON THEIR QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS AS WELL AS UPON THEIR LOCATION AND THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES. EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM CONSIDERATION CANNOT BE OBJECTIVELY APPRAISED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN MANIFESTATION OF A TENDENCY TO DEVIATE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. YET IT IS PRECISELY THIS PRINCIPLE THAT BOTH SIDES QUITE CORRECTLY CONSIDER TO BE FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE, OF COURSE, THAT IN CONSIDERING THE VERY SAME PHENOMENA DIFFERENT SIDES MAY MAKE A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE PHENOMENA ON THE WHOLE PROBLEM UNDER DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS IT IS NECESSARY TO FREE ONESELF OF SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA, TO MAKE A SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE OBJECTIVELY EXISTING REALITY WHICH IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS CANNOT BE IGNORED, AND TO DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS THEREFROM. NEVERTHELESS, ON THIS QUESTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US APPARENTLY STILL REMAIN. EXEMPT-3 JOHNSON

SECRET
NMAFVVZCZ

ADP000
SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00181 02 OF 02 081852 Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

/026 W
---------- 007014
O P 081711 Z MAY 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1974
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0181

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

IT IS NATURAL THAT ON THE SIDE WHICH PROPOSES TO SOLVE

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES A QUESTION ARISES: " WHY IS IT THAT THE OTHER SIDE DOES NOT WANT TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER PRECISELY IN THE CONTEXT OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE? WHAT HINDERS IT FROM APPROACHING THIS OBJECTIVELY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE?"

CONSIDERATIONS CAN BE HEARD THAT SUPPOSEDLY THE SO-CALLED CENTRAL SYSTEMS ARE THE PRIMARY ONES, DETERMINING THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND SO FORTH. BUT SUFFICE IT TO REVERSE THE EQUATION, OR EVEN SIMPLY TO IMAGINE THAT THE SIDES HAVE TRADED PLACES, AND THE REACTION OF THE SIDE WHICH WOULD HAVE MAINTAINED THAT KIND OF A POINT OF VIEW WOULD, NATURALLY, CHANGE PROMPTLY. IN THAT CASE THE ATTITUDE TO OCCASIONAL REFERENCES TO ALLIANCE OBLIGA-TIONS WOULD ALSO CHANGE, FOR SURE.

THUS, IF THE QUESTION IS APPROACHED OBJECTIVELY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE, IT CANNOT BUT BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OR CORRESPONDING

SECRET

SECRET

BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ONES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. RAISING THIS ISSUE AT THE NEGOTIATIONS REFLECTS AN ACTUAL AND SINCERE STRIVING TO EMBODY IN THE SOUGHT- FOR PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSI-BILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES.

IT IS ALSO NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAT FOR PEOPLE OF SIDE A WHICH COULD BE STRUCK BY THE FORWARD- DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF SIDE B IT MAKES NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE WHICH SYSTEMS THIS COULD BE DONE BY, THAT IS, BY " CENTRAL" OR BY " NON- CENTRAL" SYSTEMS. I AM NOT EVEN MENTIONING THE FACT THAT GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ALL OVER THE GLOBE IS IN ITSELF FRAUGHT WITH THE RISK OF UNINTENDED OR ACCIDENTAL UNLEASHING OF NUCLEAR WAR. I BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WHICH BY NOW EXISTS BETWEEN US, WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO SUCH CONSIDERATIONS EITHER, FOR AFTER ALL THE ISSUE IS EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT-- THIS IS A MATTER OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

OF COURSE, WE REALIZE THAT THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAW-ING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IS NOT SIMPLE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ITS PHASES SOLUTION, AS I ALREADY STATED AT THE LAST

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

MEETING, MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO SEEK WAYS TOWARD AN MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT IN ADVANCING OUR COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON THIS ISSUE ON APRIL 12, 1973, WE DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER VARIANTS OF A PHASED SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION, WHICH MIGHT BE ADVANCED BY THE OTHER SIDE.

MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U. S. SIDE TO THE PROPOSAL WE ADVANCED ON APRIL 6, 1973 WITH RESPECT TO LONG- RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES ON AIRCRAFT. THIS IS A SERIOUS AND

SECRET

SECRET

IMPORTANT PROBLEM. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND EVIDENTLY NEITHER SIDE WANTS TO IMPAIR IT OR WEAKEN ITS SIGNIFICANCE. WE ARE ALSO FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT WE CAN AND MUST WORK OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THAT WOULD BLOCK ANY CHANNEL FOR A BUILD-UP IN SUCH ARMAMENTS.

LET US IMAGINE THAT ONE OF THE SIDES, IN IMPROVING ITS STRATEGIC AVIATION, WERE TO START TESTING, PRODUCING AND DEPLOYING LONG- RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS DEEP IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE FROM DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, WITHOUT APPROACHING ITS BORDERS. WHAT WOULD THIS REALLY REPRESENT? WOULD THIS NOT IN FACT BY AN ACTION IN CIRCUMVENTION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT? WOULD THIS NOT REALLY LEAVE UNBLOCKED A CHANNEL FOR A SUBSTNTIAL BUILD- UP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS? WE WOULD LIKE COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSSTANDING TO BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN US ON THE NECESSITY TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF LONG- RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTABILIZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION FROM THIS DIRECTION.

IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION THIS IS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, NOT ONLY IN WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO IN CONSIDERING POSSIBLE PARTIAL AGREEMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES.

SUBSEQUENTLY WE INTEND TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH THE CONSIDERATIONS OF OUR DELEGATION ON INDIVIDUAL CONCRETE QUESTIONS. WE HOPE THAT THE U. S. DELEGATION FOR ITS PART WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WORK ENTRUSTED TO US,

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

BOTH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IN THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING WORLD
PEACE. EXEMPT-3 JOHNSON

SECRET
NMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INFORMATION, O, TAGS, XGDSI
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00181
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: XGDSI
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730539/aaaaikzc.tel
Line Count: 281
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 980107
Subject: SEMENOV STATEMENT MAY 8, 1973
TAGS: PARM, E
To: MOSCOW
NATO
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005